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Abstract: This paper examines the application of article 53 of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), which provides the prosecutor with the discretionary power to decline to 
investigate or prosecute, if the ‘interests of justice’ would not be served. First, it will analyse the 
scope of the concept of the ‘interests of justice’. Second, it will consider whether the prosecutor 
should take into consideration alternative justice mechanisms when making the decision. It will 
further investigate whether ‘peace processes’ can be under the consideration of the prosecutor 
when deciding on the ‘interests of justice’.   
This issue is part of my wider research project, which provides an analytical discussion of 
the prosecutorial discretion of the prosecutor. It reflects on the approaches to the relationship 
between international law and politics advanced by Martti Koskenniemi. His theory aims to help 
decision-makers to work objectively whenever a tension arises between concrete and normative 
demands in international legal institution.  
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Introduction 
The debates about the use of the discretionary power of officials within any legal system always 
raise the question of political influence. This is the case in international law, in general, and in the 
work of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in particular. Article 53 of the Statute of the ICC 
is one of the Statute articles, which raises such concern. Subparagraphs (1) (c) and (2) (c) confer 
on the prosecutor the prerogative to decline an investigation or prosecution in ‘the interests of 
justice’. The article provides the prosecutor with a critical power, which she can exercise in a 
broad discretionary manner.  
The significant aspect of article 53 is driven from two main issues. The first is that, since 
the establishment of the ICC in 2002, the prosecutor has not used her discretion to decline any 
investigation or prosecution in ‘the interests of justice’. Despite the fact that the article has never 
been invoked, there has been much speculation within the Court and beyond about the scope of 
this article. Second, sub-paragraphs (1) (c) and (2) (c) of article 53 raises two main concerns, 
resulting from its non-application and the loose meaning of the term ‘the interests of justice’. 
These concerns are related to questions over what is the scope of the ‘interests of justice’? And 
when can the prosecutor decide not to open an investigation or prosecute a certain situation or a 
case? The next concern is that, if the prosecutor made her decision to decline a situation or a 
case, what other alternative justice mechanisms would be acceptable to the prosecutor? The latter 
concern opens another discussion about whether or not ‘peace processes’ can delay or cease the 
criminal proceedings.      
Much of the current literature indicates concerns about the ability of the prosecutor to 
decline an investigation or prosecution, as they believe that the latter has no such a right.1 
However, other scholars argue that the prosecutor has a power of declination, and that such 
power would be consistent with the Statute.2 My discussion will seek to interpret the scope of 
article 53, which apparently provides the prosecutor with this power, instead of discussing 
whether or not the prosecutor has such a right. It addresses the main problem, raised essentially 
by scholars who want to avoid politically motivated decisions. The paper will argue that the 
prosecutor can decline the proceedings, without being politically-motivated.3 In addressing this 
 
1 Policy Paper: The Meaning of “The Interests of Justice” in Article 53 of the Rome Statute, Human Rights Watch, 
June (2005), available at < http://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/icc/docs/ij070505.pdf>, arguing in favour of 
committing to criminal justice. See also Martin Macpherson, Open letter to the Chief Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court: Comments on the concept of the interests of justice, Amnesty International, June 2005, available at < 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/IOR40/023/2005>. see also Richard J. Goldstone and and Nicole Fritz, 
‘In the Interests of Justice’ and Independent Referral: The ICC Prosecutor's Unprecedented Powers, Leiden Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 13, Issue 03 (2000), 655- 667, see also Dražan Djukić, Transitional Justice and the ICC: in the 
‘Interests of Justice’, Centre Universitaire de Droit International Humanitaire (2006), P. 1- 69 June (2005), available at < 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/icc/docs/ij070505.pdf>, arguing in favour of committing to criminal 
justice.  
2 Henry M. Lovat, Delineating the Interests of Justice: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, bepress Legal Series, Paper, 1435 (2006), See also, Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests 
of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court, European Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 14 (2003), P 481- 505, see also Matthew R. Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion within the International 
Criminal Court, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2004), 71- 95 
3 These arguments will be presented by depending on the objectivity theory of an international legal discourse, 
advanced by Martti Koskenniemi. This theory provides helpful lens in understanding the exercise of discretion, as his 
complex defense of international law from just being politics is what such an exercise of discretion entails to 
consider. The objective international legal discourse needs two requirements: normativity and concreteness. The 
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issue, I draw on the experience of previous international criminal tribunals, where the prosecutors 
faced the same dilemma in an effort to establish whether any lessons can be learned. I will also 
rely on interviews I conducted with four members of staff of the Office of the Prosecution 
(OTP), as an inductive study that has had shaped my views on several points.4  
 
      
Prosecutorial Discretion under Article 53 
Article 53 first deals with the investigation stage and provides the prosecutor with a power not to 
open an investigation in a certain situation on the basis of ‘the interests of justice’.5 It provides 
two criteria that the prosecutor should consider when making a negative decision: ‘the gravity of 
the crime and the interests of victims’. These criteria do not seem exclusive, as the article 
continues, ‘there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve 
the interests of justice’. The word ‘nonetheless’ indicates that the prosecutor could also consider 
other factors. This can give an implication that the Statute is inclined to adopt a wide 
interpretation of the meaning of ‘the interests of justice’.  
In sub-paragraph (2) (c), the provision also deals with the prosecution stage.6 If the 
prosecutor decides to open the investigation in the given situation, she, then, will move on to the 
prosecution stage and may decide whether or not to prosecute. At this stage, the prosecutor is 
entitled to select cases within the given situation to which the prosecutor has opened the 
investigation. In addition to the above two criteria, this sub-paragraph adds two more criteria that 
the prosecutor is required to consider when making a decision: ‘the age or infirmity of the alleged 
perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime.’ 
The wording of the text implies that the prosecutor may utilize a broad meaning of justice 
when making a decision not to proceed, as the Statute adds two further factors to be balanced. 
As Drazan Djukic expressed, ‘the article speaks of “all the circumstances, including…” (emphasis 
added) which renders the list of factors illustrative instead of exhaustive.’7 However, apart from 
the scope of the prosecutor’s power in defining the scope of the ‘interests of justice’, the article 
subjects the decision not to proceed in ‘the interests of justice’ to the Pre-Trial Chamber, which 
 
normativity of international law assumes that international law should be based on principles and can be applied 
regardless of the subjective will, interest, and behaviour of a state. But in this case, this law, which is regulated and 
not based on actual practices of the state, is merely utopian, as it cannot be verified by reference to the actual practice 
of states. With respect to concreteness, it runs in an opposing way. It assumes that international law should be 
regulated and based in accordance with the actual practice of states in the sense that makes it able to be verifiable by 
reference to the will, interest, and behaviour of a state. But this law, which sets a distance between itself and a natural 
morality, seems mere apology. Koskenniemi opines that we need to balance between these requirements so we can 
come up with objective discourse, see Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, the Structure of International Legal 
Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
4 I conducted these interviews from 11th to 20th March, 2013.  I followed semi-structured interviews with four 
members of staff of the OTP: Head, International Relations Task Force, OTP, Senior Appeal Counsel, Trial Lawyer, 
and Prosecutor during the trial stage. Each interview took around one hour 
5 The sub-paragraph reads ‘In deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether: 
Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to 
believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.’ 
6 The sub-paragraph reads, ‘If, upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that there is not a sufficient basis 
for a prosecution because: A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account 
all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged 
perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime;’ 
7 Supra n. 1, Dražan Djukić, P. 26 
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can review the decision on its own initiative.8 More than that, if the Pre-Trial Chamber dismisses 
the negative decision of the prosecutor, it can oblige the latter to proceed with the investigation 
or prosecution.   
 
 
The Decision’s Timing  
The big challenge in this regard is when are the most appropriate times that the prosecutor can 
apply article 53? Drawing on my initial contact with the Prosecutor and other evidence in the 
public domain, it appears that the OTP would construe the term narrowly and not take into 
account any alternative to the criminal justice system, on the ground that the task of the Court is 
confined to criminal prosecutions.9 The underlying reason behind this policy is the principal 
policy that the OTP has sought to develop. They seek to adopt a zero-tolerance policy against 
perpetrators of serious crimes of concern to the international community and, therefore, put an 
end to the era of impunity. While it seems that such a policy has merit, there is a doubt about its 
success, since, as a matter of fact, such tribunals, however, work within a political environment, 
and exercise their jurisdiction over crimes that also have, to a large extent, political dimensions. 
However, article 53 still provides four circumstances in which the prosecutor might 
decline the ongoing proceedings. It is very important to bear in mind that most of these criteria 
are of a dual nature, and rather, could function in two different ways. The Statute does not show 
how much weight will be given to each factor. However, the OTP in its policy paper on ‘the 
interests of justice’ suggests three basic priorities will be considered when dealing with these 
criteria.10 First is the exceptional nature of ‘the interests of justice’, which supposes that there is a 
presumption in favour of investigation and prosecution, even if the criteria are met. Second, the 
objects and purposes of the Statute will guide the exercise of the discretionary function when 
considering these criteria. Third, the OTP presumed that there is a difference between ‘the 
interests of justice’ and the interests of peace. The latter falls within the mandate of other 
international institutions, in particular the United Nations Security Council. It appears, then, that 
the OTP is inclined to favour the demands of criminal justice ahead of the demands of 
alternative justice.   
 
a. The gravity of the Crime 
The first factor is ‘the gravity of the crime’. The inclusion of the gravity test within this article, 
where the prosecutor has a large discretion, indicates that the gravity concept serves a 
 
8 The Pre-Trial Chamber is an important judicial part of the Court, whose function starts at the early stage of the 
judicial proceedings, when the Prosecutor presents a situation or a case to it, until the confirmation of charges. For 
more information about this body see, ICC, Pre-Trial Division, available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/chambers/pre%20trial%20division/Pages/pre%20trial%20
division.aspx>   
9 This was Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda’s answer to my question about the prospects of the application of Article 53. 
She stated that if the current works of the Court disturbed national activities of the given situation, she would 
reconsider her proceedings and apply Article 53. This was during a lecture run by Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda at 
Birkbeck College on 29 November, 2012. For more information about the other evidence (such as the policy paper 
issued by the OTP), see, Supra n. 1 and 2 
10 ICC, Office of Prosecution, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September, 2007, available at 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09 
73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf>, Pp. 3-4 
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discretionary function. 11 This criterion seems to function in two opposite ways. In other words, 
the prosecutor can consider the severity of the situation or the case as a basis for proceeding with 
the investigation or prosecution. This can be deduced from the general priorities that the OTP 
developed for the evaluation of ‘the interests of justice’. On the other hand, the prosecutor may 
use the potential reverse effects of the initiation of the criminal proceedings, as a basis not to 
proceed with the investigation or prosecution. This seems a difficult assessment that the OTP 
might face. However, history has shown over time that there are some particular egregious 
offences, which are so grave in their nature, that should be always prosecuted, whatever the 
consequences of initiating criminal proceedings. The International Tribunal of Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Tribunal for Rwanda’s experiences have demonstrated 
several lessons that the ICC should develop. For example, these Tribunals have sought to 
concentrate on situations and cases that have ‘particular historical resonance, such as the shelling 
of the marketplace in Sarajevo and the Srebrenica massacre.’12 Although all crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the Court are serious enough, nevertheless, crimes such as genocide and crimes 
related to sexual violence should be always considered as grave crimes that warrant the attention 
of the Court.13  
 
b. The Interests of Victims  
‘The interest of victims’ is a second factor that the prosecutor can use to stop proceeding with 
either the investigation or prosecution. This particular factor was well established in the practice 
of the ICTY’s jurisprudence. The decision not to indict Slobodan Milosevic on the eve of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, although the latter was allegedly responsible for several serious crimes, 
is an example that showed how Prosecutor Richard J. Goldstone was aware of this particular 
criterion: ‘the interests of victims’.14 This decision was still necessary in order not to make the 
situation of the victims worse. This also shows how ‘the interests of victims’ and ‘the role of the 
perpetrators’ overlapped.  
These interests are often varied across time and geography. While some victims of a 
certain situation might demand that criminal justice be done, ‘others would prefer to bury the 
past’.15 This prospect is highly likely linked to certain circumstances, where several factors can 
shape the demands of those victims. The most preeminent one is the role of the perpetrators in 
the given situation, where they still hold office or military command. For example, those 
perpetrators, by virtue of their strong positions, may oblige the victims to be satisfied with 
peaceful settlements, as a strategy to avoid a criminal justice fate. The absence of conditions, in 
which a criminal trial could be held, such as the lack or the unavailability of effective enforcement 
mechanisms, is another consideration that might make this approach inapplicable. So depending 
on the given factors, the prosecutor is required to determine which demands would be 
considered. The dual nature of this criterion makes the evaluation of this factor by the prosecutor 
 
11 Ignaz Stegmiller, The Gravity Threshold under the ICC Statute: Gravity Back and Forth in Lubanga and 
Ntaganda, International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2009), Pp. 561-5 
12 Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the 
International Criminal Court, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97 (2003), P. 543 
13 The crimes that are under the jurisdiction of the Court are: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
aggression, see articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the ICC Statute 
14 Slobodan Milosevic was a President of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, indicted by the ICTY for several 
international crimes, and died during his trial in 2006 
15 Making Kampala Count: Advancing the Global Fight against Impunity at the ICC Review Conference, Human 
Rights Watch (2010), P. 95, available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/05/10/making-kampala-count-0> 
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unpredictable. As the prosecutor is required to protect the victims by bringing justice to them, 
she might decide not to initiate a criminal prosecution. In the latter case, the prosecutor 
sometimes needs to consider any serious bad effect on the victims’ life or dignity that could result 
from the investigation or prosecution.16  
The prosecutor might be required to weigh these factors to adopt a certain strategy; not 
necessarily to stop a prosecution, however. This is exactly what happened in the ICTY’s 
experience, where these two factors played essential role in mapping the strategy of prosecution 
followed by Goldstone, alongside with the then available enforcement mechanisms.17 For 
example, although the position of Milosevic at that time constituted a fundamental reason that 
required Goldstone not to indict him on the eve of the Dayton Peace Agreement, this situation 
was changed later, when the Prosecutor found that his role no longer constituted any risk to the 
interests of victims. The availability of the political wills of powerful states was another critical 
factor that encouraged the Prosecutor, based on the other two factors, to make a case against 
Milosevic.  
Such an overlapping relationship between these criteria requires the prosecutor to 
examine the given situation by considering all details of it, as these interests are ‘by nature a case-
by-case affair’.18 It is not necessary that the prosecutor should decide not to prosecute to save ‘the 
interests of justice’; she can also exercise a comprehensive strategy by depending on the relevant 
circumstances to decide on the issue. For example, the postponement of the decision, as in the 
case of Milosevic, can be one of the strategies that the prosecutor can follow. Thus, even if the 
initiation of investigation or prosecution is not in ‘the interests of justice’, based on the 
examination of ‘the interests of victims’, this does not mean that the prosecutor should make a 
final decision not to proceed. The prosecutor can utilise her power and exercise a comprehensive 
strategy and delay the timing of the decision, based on the given circumstances of the situation or 
case.19   
 
c. The Role of the Alleged Perpetrators  
‘The role of the alleged perpetrators’ is an additional criterion that was mentioned only in the 
context of the prosecution stage, along with ‘the age and infirmity of the alleged perpetrator’. 
This criterion also can be interpreted by the prosecutor in two opposite ways. While it can be a 
reason for rejecting the case, it also can serve for initiating it. In other words, the duality nature of 
this test leaves the prosecutor with a broad space to decide on the issue. The ICTY again gives an 
example, where remarkably this factor again was tested. For instance, Goldstone indicted Ratko 
Mladic and Radovan Karadzic despite their role at the time of indicting them. There was a fear 
that the indictment of those people might have adverse effects on the then peace negotiations 
and that the prosecutor should consider the positions of those criminals. However, the 
prosecutor believed that the indictments of such people would help to weaken their role in the 
Balkan conflict. And this is exactly what happened. The ICTY’s experience showed first how 
Goldstone first identified these criteria that have been codified now in article 53, on the 
international level, and, second, how these criteria can be used in opposite ways. However, it is 
very important to bear in mind that the political environment at that time was in favour of issuing 
 
16 The English Code for Crown Prosecutors (2013) has mentioned this particular case, see P. 4.12 
17 For more information about prosecution’ strategy of Goldstone, see Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hands of 
Vengeance, (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002) 
18 Alexander K. A. Greenwalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal 
Court, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 50, No. 1 (2010), P. 145 
19 An interview with a staff member of the Office of the Prosecution conducted on 12 March, 2012 
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such decisions against those perpetrators, while the same environment was not conducive for 
indicting Milosevic.  
 
d. The Age or Infirmity of the Alleged Perpetrator  
‘The age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator’ seems the clearest factor that is not open to 
various interpretations. Augusto Pinochet’s case is a good example to discuss this factor. 
Although Pinochet was indicted for serious crimes, including crimes against humanity, he never 
stood trial.20 It is true that the Spanish court had already issued the prosecution decision, and later 
on, the full trial processes were completed by British court. However, the trial process was ended 
when Pinochet appealed the decision on the basis of his health condition. Pinochet made two 
appeals, based on his health condition, before the British Home Secretary accepted it.21 The latter 
rejected all appeals on the basis of humanitarian considerations, and decided to complete all 
judicial and appeal processes before making the decision on his health condition. On 8th of 
October 1999, the British Home Secretary, Jack Straw, announced that Pinochet would not be 
extradited, in view of his poor health.22  
This example seems to indicate that the health condition should be interpreted in a narrow 
way. Although Pinochet was in a poor health, the full trial processes took place. Therefore, if 
poor health can exclude the individual criminal responsibility of the alleged perpetrator, that does 
not preclude the prosecutor from the very beginning of the criminal proceedings from 
prosecuting him or her. It is only when the investigative and/or prosecutorial proceedings affect 
the mental or physical health of the alleged perpetrator that the prosecutor should stop the 
proceeding with the trial.23 However, the prosecutor is still able to exercise more than one 
strategy in such situation. The prosecutor, for example, can follow the policy of postponement, in 
the same way that the ICTY dealt with Milosevic's ill-health through adjournments and 
postponements.’24 
 
 
Possible Alternative Justice Mechanisms  
The next concern of the article is whether other alternative justice mechanisms would be 
acceptable to the prosecutor, as an alternative to ICC proceedings. The significance of this 
concern is the current discussions that argue that the prosecutor should not defer the situation or 
case to any alternative mechanism, and should commit only to the criminal justice approach.25 
Advocates of this view developed their arguments on a theoretical basis, which implies that the 
 
20 For information about Pinochet case, see Eamon C. Merrigan, The General and his Shield: the Extradition Process 
Against General Pinochet Ugrate, Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, Vol. 15 (2001), 101- 119 
21 See R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Pinochet Ugarte CO/1786/99 (Q.B. 1999), or 
Pinochet Ugarte, R (on the application of) v Secretary Of State For Home Department [1999] EWHC Admin 505 
(27th May, 1999), Judgmental UK Case Law Made Public, available at < http://judgmental.org.uk/judgments/EWHC-
Admin/1999/[1999]_EWHC_Admin_505.html>  
22 See News Flash: Pinochet Case, Chile’s request to release Pinochet on health grounds: a medical and judicial 
matter, not a political one, Amnesty International, AI INDEX: EUR 45/40/99 (1999), available at 
<http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/EUR45/040/1999/fr/dad588c0-aedf-447c-978f-
4dd37540c126/eur450401999en.pdf> 
23 see P. 6.5 (g) of the Code 
24 Philippa Webb, The ICC Prosecutor's Discretion Not to Proceed in the "Interests of Justice", Criminal Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 50 (2005), P. 333 
25 Supra n. 1 and 2 
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retributive justice can serve better to end the era of impunity and violence.26 In addition, they 
exploited the looseness of the meaning of the term ‘interests of justice’ and followed the aims of 
the given institution, as a second source for the interpretation of the norm.27 By following this 
source, they found that the main aim of the ICC is to insist on bringing criminal justice to both 
victims and perpetrators.28 Accordingly, it is the criminal justice approach that the prosecutor 
should consider, when making a decision. The arguments were mainly based on the 
indeterminate meaning of justice, which implies that the wording of the text of the article cannot 
be used to find out the exact meaning of the term. To reply to this inquiry, it seems that the 
interpretation of the wording of article 53 is possible, and can find out what kinds of mechanisms 
the prosecutor can defer to, without resorting to the purposes of the Court that are laid down in 
the preamble of the Court’s Statute.29  
To discuss the above point, we need first to distinguish between the investigation phase 
and the prosecution phase. From a legal point of view, before the prosecutor makes a decision to 
investigate, she first seeks to receive information, and collect evidence, via communications and 
referrals. This early stage of investigation is called a preliminary investigation. Now, the sort of 
decision that the prosecutor can make at this stage is the decision of investigation (investigative 
proceedings). At this stage (investigation stage), the investigative proceedings are not conducted, 
such as identifying alleged perpetrators, exact incidents, victims, the sort of criminal 
responsibility, the link between the incidents and their perpetrators, and bringing witnesses. 
Therefore, if the prosecutor decided to stop the investigation at this particular stage, then, it 
seems that any justice alternative may be acceptable, even if the latter alternative does not include 
any investigative proceeding. This can be deduced from the wording of the text of article 53.30     
Now, the same argument made above can be applied to the second phase: the prosecution 
stage. However, this needs a further explanation. If the prosecutor decided to investigate the 
given situation and then decided not to prosecute any case on the basis of ‘the interests of 
justice’, different mechanisms would be relevant. At the prosecution stage, it seems again that the 
criterion ‘the interests of justice’ might be used to cease a prosecution, but not an investigation. 
The prosecutor, at this stage, completed the investigative proceedings and declined to prosecute 
any case. This means that the prosecutor, at this stage, can defer to other mechanisms that do not 
involve prosecutorial decisions. However, the alternatives do need to involve investigative 
proceedings. Therefore, the prosecutor should be strict, at this particular stage, when interpreting 
the term of ‘justice’. For example, a truth commission approach, in its narrow meaning, which 
involves investigative proceedings and not the decision to prosecute, may be an acceptable 
 
26 They found that the Preamble of the ICC Statute emphasises the necessity of providing criminal justice to both 
victims and perpetrators of any conflict, see supra n. 1 and 2 of the views of those authors 
27 They used Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which set out the general sources of the 
interpretation of treaties. These sources are in order. The second one is that, if the wording of the text is not clear, 
then, the main aims and goals of the given treaty can be utilised 
28 For example, Paragraph 4 of the Preamble of the Statute provides that ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished’ 
29 Most of the scholarships and some international human rights organisations have initially argued against any 
decision that might stop the proceedings in ‘the interests of justice’. Basically, the latter views were based on the lack 
of clarity of the phrase: ‘the interests of justice’ that is open for different interpretations. This pushed them to 
exclude the wording text to interpret the exact meaning of the phrase and use other sources, such as the aims of the 
Court, to build their views, See supra n. 1 and 2 to know further information about the arguments presented by those 
groups 
30 Public apologies, reparatory justice, National Remembrance Day, administrative justice, constitutional justice, 
historical justice, and peace process are some examples that can be relevant alternatives, as they, sometimes, might 
not involve any investigative or prosecutorial process or they might result from non-investigative mechanisms 
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alternative. The truth seeking approach is the ideal approach that refers to the process of 
investigation and does not end up with any prosecution decision. Ultimately, if the above 
interpretation is correct, then one can say that the first part of article 53 should be read in a broad 
way, but the second one in a narrow way. In other words, the discretionary function looks more 
significant at the prosecution stage than the investigation stage.  
 
 
Is Peace Process within the Scope of ‘the Interests of Justice?’  
A third concern of article 53 is whether or not peace processes can be taken into account. Can 
the latter prospect come within the parameters of the broad meaning of ‘justice’? Basically, the 
Prosecutor, the policy paper on ‘the interests of justice’, and most commentators have answered 
no.31 However, the previous Prosecutor32 and the incumbent one33 seem inconsistent, as both 
have answered that they would consider the impact of the proceedings on national efforts to 
achieving peace on some other occasions.  
To find out whether peace talks come within the confines of justice, we need to look at 
article 53, the policy paper on ‘the interests of justice’, and my own data, which I collected by 
interviewing members of staff of the OTP. Obviously, the wording of the text of the article does 
not make any reference to peace processes. However, the balancing test that article 53 provides 
might merit an examination of the position of peace within the article. Among the factors that 
the article suggests are ‘the role of the alleged perpetrator’ and ‘the interests of victims’. These 
factors, as was explained above, have a dual nature in the sense that they are open to different 
interpretations. Having looked at history, one can see that these factors were taken into 
considerations when handling certain situations.34 In other words, it seems that these factors may 
be used as bases to defer to peace negotiations, as will explained now.   
In order to discuss this point in more detail, we need first to distinguish between stable 
and unstable situations, whether be it during ongoing conflicts or post-conflicts. During stable 
situations, criminal prosecution may become a desirable option. This happens, essentially, in 
situations, where the alleged perpetrators have been defeated, and have had no further role in the 
given society. The perpetrators usually cease to hold power and can be apprehended with no fear 
of the renewed explosion of violence. The prosecutor can then ignore this criterion (the role of 
the alleged perpetrators) and, therefore, proceed with the investigation of prosecution. “The 
 
31 ‘‘I cannot adjust the law to the political interests. Those who manage political agenda have to respect the law’’, An 
answer of Moreno Ocampo to my own question about the application of Article 53 run via a webcast interaction. 
See this interview at: Webcast interview with ICC's former Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, International 
Bar Association, 17, October, 2012, at 
<http://wcc.webeventservices.com/eventRegistration/console/EventConsoleMVC.jsp?&eventid=529206&sessioni
d=1&username=&partnerref=&format=fhvideo1&mobile=false&flashsupportedmobiledevice=false&helpcenter=f
alse&key=47F980F3BD93A69C4C205D63E8B92504&text_language_id=en&playerwidth=800&playerheight=690&
eventuserid=70917034&contenttype=A&mediametricsessionid=56952751&mediametricid=963054&usercd=70917
034&mode=launch#> (Last Access: 10, October, 2012) 
32 See ICC, the Office of the Prosecution, Second Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr 
Moreno Ocampo, to the Security Council Pursuant to UNSC 1593 (2005) (13th December, 2005), P. 7, available at 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/2CFC1123-B4DF-4FEB-BEF4-
52E0CAC8AA79/0/LMO_UNSC_ReportB_En.pdf> 
33 Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda’s answer to my question about the prospects of the application of Article 53, where 
she stated that if the current work of the Court disturbed national activities on the given situation, she would 
reconsider her proceedings and apply Article 53. This was during a lecture run by Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda at 
Birkbeck College on 29 November, 2012 
34 Ibid 
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interests of justice” during the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were best promoted by simply 
delivering criminal justice to the perpetrators, who were not any longer in power. The same can 
be applied to the Rwanda situation, where the defeat of genocidiers made the criminal justice 
response an ideal mechanism to deal with the post-conflict transition without a fear about “the 
interests of justice”.  
Things look different when it comes to talk about unstable situations, however. Indeed, 
there are several historical examples that demonstrate that a variety of justice mechanisms 
(criminal and non-criminal mechanisms) have been applied to such situations (unstable 
situations).35  However, there was a common shared feature that shaped this situation, where the 
political and military strategies articulated to end the violence or to boost the fragile peace 
processes played essential roles in the eventuality of prosecution on peaceful transitions. In other 
words, articulating “the interests of justice” was, to a large extent, affected by the accompanying 
political and military circumstances. For example, one of the worst atrocities that was committed 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Srebrenica massacre by Mladic, happened only two years after the 
establishment of the ICTY.36  
When the perpetrators of this massacre and other crimes, such as Karadzic, no longer 
held power, Goldstone developed his strategy and, accordingly, decided to indict those 
perpetrators, as there would be no further atrocity or threat to the ongoing peace talks.37 This 
happened on the eve of the Dayton Peace Agreement, when Goldstone indicted only Karadzic 
and Mladic, and totally ignored Milosevic, who was still needed for the process of the Dayton 
talk.38 It was only after the NATO intervention in Kosovo that made Milosevic no more 
dangerous for any violent backlash (interests of victims).39 The latter environment, which 
obviously had political considerations, provided an ideal opportunity for the hunter to hunt his 
prey. These critical cases are examples that demonstrated that the pragmatic considerations were 
needed for a better strategy on a prosecutorial discretion. Further, considering these accounts was 
apparently a part of the decision-making process that provided the Prosecutor with a wide space 
to move without prejudice to the independence of the Prosecutor, as a body within a judicial 
institution.  
The same argument could be applied to the Darfur situation, where the prosecution 
approach may have resulted in increasing the level of suffering (interests of victims), and those 
who were indicted by the ICC and are still in power have still been committing war crimes.40 
 
35 El Salvador and Haiti adopted non-criminal mechanisms, while Uganda, Sierra Leone and Rwanda and Former 
Yugoslavia adopted a criminal approach 
36 See supra n. 17. Here, I am linking the crimes committed in Balkan wars to the establishment of the tribunal, as this 
was not all the time a case. Hazan said that ‘The UN peacekeeping forces present in the former Yugoslavia reported 
that the warring parties took account of the legal risk during the first few weeks after the creation of the ICTY in 
1993. They later realized that the Tribunal was weak and, confident of impunity, committed the Srebrenica 
massacres.’ According to this statement, there was a link between the crimes committed and the establishment of the 
tribunal, at least, at the beginning of the conflict, see Pierre Hazan, Measuring the Impact of Punishment and 
Forgiveness: a Framework for Evaluating Transnational Justice, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88, No. 861 
(2006), P. 35 
37  Supra n. 17 Bass, Pp. 227-30 
38 Ibid P.237 
39 The NATO war in Kosovo changed the priorities of the war strategies, where Milosevic was considered to be an 
obstacle to the stability of the region, as he began to lose his power. Then, the political and military environment was 
ideal for the Prosecutor to indict him as “the interests of justice” were not at risk any more 
40 When the President of Sudan was indicted by the Prosecutor, who ignored calls by the Arab League, the African 
Union, several African States, and China not to indict him, Omer Al-Bashir responded to this indictment by 
suspending the operation of aid groups, which left thousands of people in Darfur, including IDPs with no life 
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However, there is a preeminent difference between Darfur and Yugoslavia, which is the 
enforcement problem. In the ICTY situation, despite the fact that the Prosecutor still used his 
discretion to select his targets in the most relevant circumstances, the Prosecutor was acting 
within an environment where effective enforcement mechanisms were available.41 This, first, 
pushed the decision-makers to approach a criminal prosecution mechanism as a de facto approach 
to address the conflict. Second, it allowed the Prosecutor to use his discretion in a more 
convenient way, as the prospects of arresting the potential indictees were relatively high.  
In the Darfur situation, the enforcement mechanisms are not effective, and the political 
environment is not helpful for the OTP, as most African states are against the policy of the OTP, 
in particular in the Darfur situation.42 Further, all indictees of the Sudanese Government are still 
at large. Hence, the prosecutor decided not to apply article 53 and indicted the most responsible 
for committing crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, including the President of Sudan, 
although an effective enforcement mechanism is not available.43 The SC’s resolution referring the 
Darfur situation to the ICC did not provide any serious mechanisms for enforcing the decision.44 
In addition, the ICC entirely depends on the political will of states in enforcing its decisions. The 
consequences of this strategy were the failure of any peace process taken to end the conflict and a 
noticeable growth in the level of violence since the prosecution and indictment decisions against 
Sudan and those who are still in power, respectively.45  
This does not mean at all that the Prosecutor should not have indicted the President; 
instead he could have exercised a better strategy if he had considered these pragmatic 
considerations. It is true that considering these accounts does not necessarily guarantee the 
capture of the alleged perpetrators. However, such a strategy, at least, gives a better chance of 
arresting the fugitives. In other words, bringing the political idea of justice within the legal 
framework of the ICC by emphasising the discretionary power of the prosecutor can help to 
exercise a better strategy. For example, he could consider the strong role and position of the 
President and, therefore, decide not to prosecute him until he has built the case against him when 
the pragmatic considerations are available.  
 
services, see Kate Allan, Prosecution and Peace: a Role for Amnesty before the ICC? Denver Journal of International Law 
and Policy, Vol. 39, No.1 (2011), Pp. 275-6  
41 The existence of NATO, and the effective supports that were given to the ICTY by the then Governments of the 
fighting states were some available tools at the time, see more supra n. 17 
42 Most recently, the Chad Government refused to arrest the President of Sudan, who visited the country recently, 
although Chad is party to the ICC and has an obligation to transfer the President to the ICC, see Chad: Hosting once 
again President al-Bashir would be a further insult to the victims of Darfur, No Peace Without Justice (8th April, 2013), 
available at <http://www.npwj.org/ICC/Chad-should-stand-justice-and-not-grant-impunity-President-al-
Bashir.html-0> (Last Access: 12th May, 2013) 
43 There are huge concerns about the public nature, benefit, seriousness, and time of the indictment of President of 
Omar Al-Bashir, as such indictment has only accelerate the rhythm of the violence in Darfur, where people are in 
desperate need of humanitarian assistance as a consequence of the indictment, see Conor Foley, This Darfur 
Prosecution is deadly, The Guardian (27, May, 2009), available at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/may/27/hay-festival-icc-darfur-sudan> (Last Access: 24, 
November, 2012). See also, James A. Goldstone, More Candour about Criteria, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
Vol. 8 (2010), P. 385 
44 UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005) 
45 Supra n. 36, Hazan, P. 35, talking about how the warring parties to the Darfur conflict took the ICC’s prosecution 
into account when committing further crimes. This argument was also asserted by a participant to a Regional 
Consultation Conference held in South-Africa, see Tim Murithi and Allan Ngari, The ICC and Community-Level 
Reconciliation: In-country Perspectives Regional Consultation Report, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation Transitional 
Justice in Africa Programme, (21st and 22nd February, 2011), available at 
<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/IJR_ICC_Regional_Consultation_Report_Final_2011.pdf> 
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Thus, the reference to pragmatic considerations does not necessarily prevent the prosecutor from 
making a decision to prosecute a certain perpetrator at all. Instead, it provides her with more 
options, so she can exercise a better prosecutorial strategy, based on the available options. This 
also reveals that the prosecutor at this stage is not politically-motivated, as the above strategy 
comes within the confines of the discretionary power. This is how Kenneth A. Rodman argued 
when he talked about the relationship between pragmatic and legal considerations by saying 
‘those episodes (the latter considerations) demonstrate that political factors -most notably the 
power of the perpetrators relative to the forces arrayed against them and the political strategies of 
the latter to address the conflict- determine when a criminal law approach is effective and 
whether it contributes to peace.’46 However, sometimes, in particular, during a point where the 
alleged perpetrators are still holding significant power or retain remarkable power, the prosecutor 
might consider ‘some compromises with criminal justice’.47 This is a critical point, which it seems 
that the OTP would not consider, as the latter is quite strict about the policy of bargaining 
paradigm, where the perpetrators might use to simply avoid any criminal justice fate.  
Then, how would the prosecutor behave in such circumstances? Is not the decision to 
refer to peace processes within the confines of justice (In its broad meaning)?48 The probable 
answer to this inquiry is to know as to whether or not the victims seek the demands of peace 
ahead of the demands of justice. If that is so, then we can say that the decision to defer to what 
victims ask for is what justice is. This is not an easy hypothesis, since; first, the perpetrators might 
impose their conditions on victims as a bargaining chip for their freedom. Second, it is quite 
difficult to identify the real needs of victims. However, the policy paper that the OTP issued 
about the interests of justice has made it very clear that the application of subparagraphs (c) of 
article 53 is exceptional in nature.49 This is also how several staff of the OTP answered my 
inquiry about the general application of article 53, where all of them confirmed that the OTP is 
extremely strict about the application of this article.50 However, the exceptional nature of ceasing 
criminal proceedings requires additional and external responses so the OTP can exercise and 
insist on the criminal prosecution. It ‘requires a commitment by international and regional actors 
to assume those risks’, as the threats posed by the alleged perpetrators are usually 
‘proportionately greater’ and imminent.51 The availability of the latter support might also affect 
the decision of the prosecutor.  
In short, the evaluation of the potential consequences of the decision of investigation or 
prosecution on the ongoing conflict or a political transition is a matter of policy and definitely 
not law. Basically, the Prosecutor is a legal body and has nothing to do with diplomatic and 
political affairs. But that does not mean that the prosecutor might ‘act as both lawyer and 
diplomat in exercising his discretion, evaluating not only the gravity of the crime and the 
admissibility of the case, but also the likely impact of an investigation or prosecution on 
 
46 Kenneth A. Rodman, Is Peace in the Interests of Justice? The Case for Broad Prosecutorial Discretion at the 
International Criminal Court, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Issue 01 (2009), P. 101 
47 Ibid P. 110 
48 It should be borne in mind that when the OTP decides to stop proceeding with the investigation or prosecution, 
the particular form of alternative would not be very important, according to an interview I conducted with a member 
staff of the OTP on 12 March, 2013. Basically, the concept of justice has broad and narrow meanings. The first 
consists of retributive, restorative, and reparatory justice, while the narrow one consists of only retributive justice. 
For more information about the meaning of justice see, Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing Challenge of 
Truth Commissions (New York, Routledge: 2002), and The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies, Report of the Secretary- General, UN Doc. S /2011/634, 12 October 2011, at P. 17  
49 Supra n. 1 
50 Several interviews with members staff of the OTP conducted on 12, 14 of March, 2013 
51 Supra n. 46, P. 115 
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prolonging a conflict or undermining a political transition.’52 In other words, the prosecutor 
sometimes might be in contact with the domestic, regional and international actors who are 
involved in the peace transition for the purposes of examining of the probable effects of criminal 
proceedings on the given situation.53 This is without any prejudice to the independence of the 
prosecutor, as the above strategy is under the discretionary power of the prosecutor. Under this 
power and the above factors, the prosecutor might consider the domestic approach and, 
therefore, might delay any criminal proceeding or just decline totally the investigation or 
prosecution. Such decisions are made on a case by case basis, where the prosecutor is required to 
examine all legal, political, and diplomatic and any other relevant aspect of the situation, bearing 
in mind the exceptional nature of application of article 53.  
The Uganda situation was among the first situations that raised the issue as to whether or 
not the peace process should be taken into prosecutorial discretion, in particular under article 53. 
Following the acceptance of Ugandan Government’s referral in 2005, some people, including 
Betty Bigombe, a former Uganda minister, some NGOs, and the Acholi community, criticized 
this referral, as they believed that the referral would disturb the peace talks. The Court decided to 
indict several alleged perpetrators from only the rebels’ side (LRA), including Joseph Kony who 
was mainly responsible for serious crimes committed against the Acholi community. While this 
conflict is still in progress, the Government of Uganda has led several initiatives to end the 
conflict by having a peace negotiation with Kony.54 The latter has refused several times to sign 
any peace talk until the ICC withdraws the arrest warrant issued against him in 2005.55 As a 
consequence, the Ugandan Government has provided a variety of alternatives to all perpetrators, 
ranging from blanket amnesty to punishment procedures against only those who committed the 
most serious crimes, without clarifying what kinds of punishments they are.56 However, the 
dilemma of justice and peace in the context of Uganda situation is still unclear, as both sides are 
still fighting each other on the one hand and seeking for a peaceful solution on the other.57 The 
question is how the prosecutor should respond to this situation. 
To accept the peace process as a solution to handling the Uganda situation according to 
article 53, is only to accept that the peace process can come within the confines of ‘the interests 
of justice’. The legal justification for such a suggestion is to factor the peace process into the 
decision-making process when the prosecutor evaluates the given situation based on her 
discretionary power. The objectivity theory advanced by Koskenniemi offers an essential 
theoretical justification to reflect on the Uganda situation. He stated that an international legal 
discourse (a decision-making) that is based on the pragmatic and legal considerations is an 
 
52 Supra n. 46, P. 121 
53 An interview with a member staff of the OTP conducted on 12 March, 2013 
54 Situation in Uganda, The Hague Justice Portal, available at <http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=6175> 
(Last Access: 2, April, 2013) 
55 See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05 
56 See Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation Between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the 
Lord's Resistance Army/ Movement, Juba Sudan, ICC-02/04-01/05-352-AnxA 18-11-2008 2/12 CB PT, available at 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc589232.pdf>, see also another agreement in 2008 about cease-fire, 
Uganda and Rebels Sign Cease-Fire, The New York Times (24 Feb, 2008), available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/world/africa/24uganda.html?_r=0> (Last Access: 26, March 2013) 
57 Both sides also signed another agreement on 2009; see Agreement on Implementation and Monitoring 
Mechanisms, Juba, Sudan, available at <http://northernuganda.usvpp.gov/uploads/images/vy0hCC-
lHclHmwkfQyIbPQ/agendaitem6signed.pdf>. See also, Michael Otim and Marieke Wierda, Uganda: Impact of the 
Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court, International Center for Transitional Justice (May, 2010), available at 
<http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Uganda-Impact-ICC-2010-English.pdf>, P. 2    
 66 
objective discourse.58 With respect to the pragmatic accounts, it is submitted that several 
pragmatic factors require the prosecutor to consider the peace efforts that have been called for by 
the main parties to the conflict. For example, the voice of victims is one important account, 
where several surveys have shown that a large number of them demanded the peace efforts ahead 
of justice demands.59 The role of the civil society, NGOs, and other domestic actors, who are 
closely engaged in the conflict and strongly believe in a peaceful solution, is another pragmatic 
factor. This can be followed by the strong position of the rebels, who are still holding a strong 
power, as Kony, for example, has refused to sign any peace talk and, therefore, end the conflict 
until the Court withdraws the arrest warrants issued against his groups. On legal considerations, 
the prosecutor may consider two criteria provided by article 53 as bases to stop the proceedings 
against the given situation: ‘the interests of victims and the role of the alleged perpetrator’. The 
consideration of the latter legal requirement alongside the pragmatic ones seems a possible 
approach towards handling the atrocities on the one hand, and on the other, avoiding the 
suspicion that the prosecutor is politically-motivated when considering those pragmatic accounts.   
 
Conclusion  
This paper sought to identify the potential prospects of the application of article 53. It showed 
that the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion in the context of evaluating ‘the interests of the 
justice’ should be based, at the most relevant circumstances, on legal and policy considerations. 
The two latter should be balanced in a way that enables the prosecutor to exercise a better 
strategy of prosecution that can help to give more effect to such a strategy, or find a better 
solution that corresponds with the national efforts to address the given situation. Therefore, the 
prosecutor, sometimes, needs to factor other concrete considerations, which are necessary for the 
exercise of the discretionary function. The unavailability of effective enforcement mechanisms 
obliges the prosecutor to defer her criminal proceedings and use a broad strategy when assessing 
the meaning of ‘justice’. Until our global society finds more credible and effective tools, we need 
to accept both faces of article 53. By then, it could be possible to change the whole argument and 
to argue for the sole commitment to a criminal justice approach. It, finally, showed that the 
prospect of the influence of the prosecutor’s decision, based on her discretionary power, by 
pragmatic considerations is inevitable.           
 
 
 
58 The Koskenniemi’s theory is not taken for granted. His theory was criticised by a variety of sources, including 
realism theory and positivism theory, and from within critical legal theory such as Dencho Georgiev. He critised the 
approach of the arguments that Koskenniemi used to produce an objective international legal discourse, see Dencho 
Georgiev, Politics or the Rule of Law: Deconstruction and Legitimacy in International Law, European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1993), 1- 14.  I also criticised him by developing a balance approach between the 
requirements of the objectivity of an international legal discourse, which I placed in my wider PhD project (Chapter 
1)  
59 For example, two surveys conducted by a group of researchers in 2005 and 2007 showed that the responses of the 
affected societies are far from uniform. The first one demonstrated that most of the respondents support the 
criminal prosecution rather than peace talks, while the second survey showed the reverse, see Phuong Pham, Patrick 
Vinck, Marieke Wierda, Eric Stover, and Adrian di Giovanni, Forgotten Voices: A Population-Based Survey of 
Attitudes about Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda, International Centre for Transitional Justice (July, 2005), available 
at <http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-HRC-Uganda-Voices-2005-English.pdf>. See also, Phuong Pham, 
Patrick Vink, Eric Stover, Marieke Wierda, Andrew Moss, and Richard Bailey, When the War Ends: A Population-
Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice, and Social Reconstruction in Northern Uganda, Human Rights Center: 
UC Berkeley (January, 2007), available at <http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/8m56w3jj#page-2> 
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